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Abstract: This article outlines a novel interpretation of quantum theory: the
Q-based interpretation. The core idea underlying this interpretation, recently sug-
gested for quantum field theories by Drummond and Reid [2020], is to interpret the
phase space function Q—a transform of the better known Wigner function—as a
proper probability distribution, roughly analogous to the probability distribution ρ
in classical statistical mechanics.
Here I motivate the Q-based interpretation, investigate whether it is empirically
adequate, and outline some of its key conceptual features. I argue that the Q-based
interpretation is attractive in that it promises having no measurement problem, is
conceptually parsimonious and has the potential to apply elegantly to relativistic
and field-theoretic contexts.
1 Introduction
This article outlines key features of a novel interpretation of quantum theory. I
propose to call it the Q-based interpretation because it attributes a central role to a
function on phase space known as the Q-function. The core idea behind the Q-based
interpretation was recently suggested for quantum field theories by Drummond and
Reid [2020]. That idea is simply to interpret the Q-function Q(q,p) as a proper
probability distribution on phase space, analogous to the probability distribution
ρ(q,p) in classical statistical mechanics.
The aims of this article are: to motivate the Q-based interpretation, to invest-
igate whether it is empirically adequate, and to outline some of its key conceptual
features. The Q-based interpretation is attractive in various respects, notably, be-
cause it promises having no measurement problem, because it is conceptually parsi-
monious in that it does not add any new elements to the formalism of quantum
theory, and because it applies to relativistic and field-theoretic contexts.
The structure of the following sections is as follows: Section 2 provides a
sketch of phase space distribution functions in quantum mechanics and reviews
some formal properties of the Q-function, which is one such distribution. Section 3
introduces the basic idea of the Q-based interpretation—interpreting the Q-function
as a proper probability distribution over phase space—and reviews some results by
Drummond [2021] concerning microdynamics of fields that would give rise to such
statistics in bosonic quantum field theory. Sections 4 and 5 outline prima facie diffi-
culties for interpreting the Q-function as a proper probability distribution and show
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how one can hope to overcome them when explicitly considering the dynamics of
measurement processes. Sections 6 and 7 explain how the Q-based interpretation,
when combined with an epistemic account of the quantum state, avoids various
no-go theorems by rejecting a temporal locality assumption that Leifer and Pu-
sey [2017] call λ-mediation. I also consider the claim by Drummond and Reid
[2020] that the Q-based interpretation entails retrocausality and argue that there
is no compelling argument for it. Section 8 turns to the prospects for applying the
Q-based interpretation to relativistic quantum theories and quantum field theor-
ies. Finally, section 9 concludes the paper with a brief summary of virtues of the
Q-based interpretation and an outlook at issues that deserve further investigation.
2 Phase space distribution functions in quantum
mechanics
Quantum mechanics might not suffer from the measurement problem if it could be
interpreted as a probabilistic theory on phase space analogous to classical statistical
mechanics. Notably, its empirical success might not be mysterious if quantum
expectation values ⟨A⟩quantum of dynamical variables A(q,p) could be understood




where f(q,p) is a probability density. For that to be possible, the integral of
f(q,p) over phase space would have to be 1, and f(q,p) would have to be non-
negative everywhere. In that case, an interpretation of f(q,p) as expressing partial
information about the location of the quantum system in phase space might be
available, analogously to how ρ(q,p) in classical statistical mechanics is usually
interpreted as expressing partial information about phase space location.
Intriguingly, identities similar to Eq. (1) hold for a variety of phase space func-
tions F (q,p), namely, identities of the form:
⟨Â(q̂, p̂)⟩quantum =
∫
A(q,p)F (q,p)dqdp . (2)
The function A(q,p) that appears on the right-hand side here is obtained from the
operator Â(q̂, p̂) which appears on the left-hand side by replacing the position and
momentum operators q̂ and p̂ with n-tuples of ordinary real numbers. For any
dynamical variable A(q,p) of interest we may insert for Â(q̂, p̂) the Hilbert space
linear operator onto which it is mapped by quantization.
Eq. (2) is not quite the same as Eq. (1) with A(q,p) promoted to Â(q̂, p̂)
because F (q,p) may not have the formal properties of a probability density and
because A(q,p) in Eq. (2) may differ from A(q,p) in eq. (1) due to the non-
commutability of q̂ and p̂. This will become relevant below.
In quantum mechanics it is always possible to express any ⟨Â(q̂, p̂)⟩quantum in
the form Eq. (2). However, there is no single phase space function F (q,p) for which
it holds uniformly. Rather, the function F (q,p) for which Eq. (2) obtains depends
on the ordering of operators in Â(q̂, p̂). For operators Â(q̂, p̂) that are symmetrized
in terms of the order in which q̂ and p̂ appear (e. g. the operator 1/2(q̂p̂+ p̂q̂)),
this is the so-called Wigner function; for standard-/antistandard ordered operators
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(q̂ before/after p̂ in all product terms), these are the so-called Kirkwood functions;
for normal-ordered operators (creation before annihilation operators, see Eqs. (7)
and (8) below for the definition of these operators) the so-called Glauber-Sudarshan
function; and for antinormal-ordered operators (annihilation before creation oper-
ators) the so-called Husimi function.
These phase space functions F (q,p) are convenient calculational tools. Accord-
ing to Lee [1995], who articulates a standard perspective, they cannot be anything
more than that. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle makes it impossible to regard
them as proper probability functions:
It has been realized from the early days [Wigner, 1932] that there is no
unique way of defining a quantum phase-space distribution function.
The concept of a joint probability at a (q, p) phase-space point is not
allowed in quantum mechanics due to the Heisenberg uncertainty prin-
ciple. The quantum phase-space distribution function should therefore
be considered as simply a mathematical tool that facilitates quantum
calculations, and as such one can devise any “quasiprobability” dis-
tribution function that one wishes as long as it yields a correct de-
scription of physically observable quantities. In many situations the
Wigner distribution function does a respectable job, and yet there
are cases where distribution functions that have different properties
than the Wigner distribution function are called for. Other distri-
bution functions that have been considered in the past include those
of Glauber-Sudarshan (Glauber 1963 [...], Sudarshan 1963)) Husimi
[1940] and Kirkwood [1933]. [Lee, 1995, p. 150]
However, prima facie at least, Lee’s claim that the Heisenberg principle rules out
“[t]he concept of a joint probability at a (q, p) phase-space point” is not compelling:
if we had an interpretation that included probabilities ascribed to sharp phase
space locations for all quantum systems at all times and understood the Heisenberg
principle as applying only on an aggregate level of measurements, there might be no
measurement problem. Such an interpretation, far from ruled out from the start,
would be very welcome! But there are other, better, reasons to doubt that there
can be such an interpretation. Those reasons have to do with two issues: (i) some
functions F (q,p) do not have the formal features of a probability density and, as
already mentioned, (ii) the dynamical variable A(q,p) in Eq. (1) and the function
A(q,p) in Eq. (2) may differ. I elaborate on issue (i) now and come back to issue
(ii) in Section 4.
The most well-known phase space distribution function F (q,p) = W (q,p),
the Wigner function, illustrates issue (i): as mentioned, if the operator Â(q̂, p̂) is
symmetric with respect to q̂ and p̂, then using W (q,p) for F (q,p) fulfils Eq. (2).
However, W (q,p) is typically negative somewhere on phase space, and this makes
it impossible to interpret it as a proper probability distribution. The same holds
for some other phase space distributions F (q,p).
The phase space regions where the Wigner function is negative are “small”,
however, in that they do not span more than a few intervals of ℏ in any direction. As
a consequence, if W (q,p) is smoothed by means of a convolution with a minimum-
uncertainty Gaussian wave packet (a so-called Weierstrass transformation), one
obtains the Husimi function, FH(q,p), which is positive semi-definite everywhere
and has all of the formal properties of a probability density. For a particle in one
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W (q′, p′) , (3)
where the right hand side specifies the convolution operation. As mentioned above,
FH(q, p) fulfils Eq. (2) if Â(q̂, p̂) is anti-normally ordered, i.e. with q̂ and p̂ ex-
pressed in terms of creation and annihilation operators (see Eqs. (8) and (7)) and
the latter to the left of the former.
For the harmonic oscillator, there is a conceptually preferred value of κ, namely,
the oscillation frequency ω. If one sets κ to ω in the Husimi function, the function






Here ρ̂ is the quantum state in density operator form and |αq,p⟩ the coherent state










The coherent states |αq,p⟩ are characterized by the fact that they are eigenstates of
the components of the annihilation operator â:
â|αq,p⟩ = αq,p|αq,p⟩. (6)








(mωq̂ − ip̂) . (8)
Phase space can be parametrized either by position and momentum variables q and
p or, equivalently, by the complex variable α that is obtained when replacing the
position and momentum operators in Eq. (7) by position and momentum phase
space variables.
All formulas Eqs. (5) – (8) tailored to the harmonic oscillator can be generalized
to bosonic quantum field theory, where ℏω is the energy of a free particle. There,





Here again the variable α parametrizes the full phase space of the (field) theory.
The Q-function—like the Husimi function, of which it is a special case—has the
formal properties of a probability density in that it is normalized to 1 and positive
semi-definite. (For an abstract general characterization of Q-functions, which also
applies to fermionic quantum field theories, see [Rosales-Zárate and Drummond,
2015], as reviewed below in Section 8.) When substituted for the function F in
Eq. (2), the Q-function provides the expectation value of A if the operator Â(q,p)
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is anti-normally ordered, i.e. has annihilation operators to the left of creation
operators in all products of such operators.
The dynamics of the Q-function follow directly from Eq. (9) together with the















Drummond [2021] investigates which form this time-evolution equation Eq. (10)
takes in bosonic quantum field theory with a generic (up to) quartic Hamiltonian.
This approach does not carry over to generic first-quantized Hamiltonians as in non-
relativistic quantum mechanics. As Drummond shows, for phase space coordinates
ϕ that are appropriately chosen linear combinations of rescaled versions of the real














Q(ϕ, t) . (12)
The coordinates ϕ can be chosen such that the diffusion matrix, which is traceless,
is diagonal, with Dµ ≥ 0 for half of all degrees of freedom µ and Dµ ≤ 0 for the
other half. Thus, intuitively, time-evolution of the Q-function in bosonic quantum
field theory with a quartic Hamiltonian corresponds to diffusion in positive and
negative time directions, differentially for different degrees of freedom. For practical
purposes, though, it is often easier to determine the time-evolution of Q by using
the von Neumann equation Eq. (10) for ρ̂t and evaluating it using Eq. (9).
3 What is the Q-based interpretation?
The core idea of the Q-based interpretation is that any quantum system has a
determinate location in phase space at all times and that the Q-function must be
interpreted as a proper probability density over phase space. Using traditional
terms, this makes the Q-based interpretation a “hidden variables” interpretation
in the same sense in which de Broglie-Bohm theory is one. It aims to solve the
measurement problem by denying that a quantum state is a complete description
of a quantum system and postulates determinate values for all dynamical variables
at all times.
According to the Q-based interpretation, a quantum system’s probability of
being in some region ∆ of phase space is given by the integral of Q(q,p) over ∆:




Thus the correct expectation values to ascribe to dynamical variables A(q,p) are





One may argue that the Q-based interpretation can provide a fully-fledged solu-
tion to the measurement problem only if it comes with an account of the underlying
microdynamics that give rise to Q-function dynamics, in analogy to the role played
by the guidance equation in de Broglie-Bohm theory. Are there basic dynamical
principles that create such aggregate behaviour as encoded in Eqs. (13) and (14)?
Drummond [2021] provides a positive answer to this question for bosonic quantum
field theory where time-evolution of the Q-function has the form Eq. (12). As he
shows, such aggregate behaviour arises from stochastic field trajectories whose prob-
abilities are given by real-valued path integrals over the exponential of a suitably
chosen time-symmetric action. This requires a little unpacking.
Consider a bosonic field ϕ and denote its values at two different times tf > t0
by ϕ0 and ϕf . As explained above, in Q-function dynamics as characterized by
Eq. (12), half of the field degrees of freedom are characterized by “forward-in-time”
diffusion and the other half by “backward-in-time” diffusion, depending on the
sign of Dµ. As Drummond [2021] shows, under these circumstances the conditional
probability P (ϕx,f , ϕy,0|ϕx,0, ϕy,f ), which mixes initial and final field configurations
for the different degrees of freedom and aligns their order with the direction of
diffusion, is proportional to a real path integral










Here L(ϕ, ϕ̇) is a so-called “central difference” Langrangian that treats ϕx and
ϕy differently, see [Drummond, 2021, Eqs. (110)-(112)] for details. Drummond
develops a scheme for solving Eq. (15) based on an extra dimension (Sect. IV) and
demonstrates solutions for examples (Sect. V). Note that, because the integrand in
Eq. (15) is real and non-negative, this path integral allows precisely the “ignorance
interpretation” over paths (in this case, field histories) that is unavailable for the
standard Feynman path integral, which has a complex integrand.1
Drummond and Reid interpret Eq. (15) as encoding retrocausality because the
later field configuration ϕy,f seemingly undergoes diffusion into the earlier one ϕy,0.
I argue below (Section 7), however, that this is not a compelling reason for a
retrocausal interpretation.
The time-mixing nature of Eq. (15) may offer us a clue about another interesting
question namely, why the wave function ψ is widely regarded as central in quantum
theory rather than Q, which is puzzling from the point of view of the Q-based
interpretation.2 The reason may have to do with the fact that, for the purposes of
reasoning about physical problems, we are temporally localized creatures. It comes
natural to us and is often dictated by practical considerations to impose single-
time boundary conditions on functions such as Q or ψ and consider time-evolution
towards the future. The Schrödinger equation can be treated in this manner: it is
typically quite convenient to impose some initial condition ψ0 for the wave function
and evolve it in time. However, when we impose an initial condition Q(ϕ0) onto
the Q-function, Eq. (15) is of no immediate help because ϕx,0 and ϕy,0 appear on
opposite sides of the “|.” This may be a (small) part of the reason why the Q-
function has so far been regarded as of secondary importance compared with the
1The Q-based interpretation may thus fulfil the hope for a field-based “all-at-once”
interpretation of the path integral articulated in [Wharton, 2016].
2I would like to thank an anonymous referee for highlighting this feature of the Q-based
interpretation.
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wave function even though, according to the Q-based interpretation, the reverse
perspective is more adequate.
4 Can the Q-based interpretation possibly be em-
pirically viable?
Having put forward the idea of interpreting the Q-function as a proper probability
density, it is time to consider what is perhaps the most natural worry about it,
namely, that it is not empirically viable. Notably, one may worry that Eq. (13)
is incompatible with how probabilities are normally derived in standard quantum
mechanics as based on Weyl quantization. This brings us back to issue (ii) that
arises when trying to interpret a phase space function as a proper probability dis-




which holds if Â(q̂, p̂) is in anti-normal order and where A(q,p) is obtained from
Â(q̂, p̂) by replacing operators with numbers. For the Q-based interpretation to be
empirically viable, this A(q,p) must equal the original dynamical variable A(q,p)
as subjected to quantization. And these two, in turn, are uniformly identical only
if the chosen quantization procedure promotes dynamical variables to Hermitian
linear operators that are anti-normally ordered, i.e. with annihilation before cre-
ation operators. This is the case in so-called Berezin (or anti-Wick) quantization,
which differs from the more commonly used Weyl quantization, where dynamical
variables are promoted to operators that are symmetrized in terms of the q̂i and
p̂i.
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The fact that symmetrized operators are not in general in anti-normal order
leads to the above issue (ii) in that, for symmetrized Â(q̂, p̂), Eq. (16) may not
be fulfilled. The quantum expectation values for dynamical variables promoted
to operators according to Weyl quantization will generally differ from the phys-
ical expectation values according to the Q-based interpretation as computed per
Eq. (14). But the well-established empirical success of quantum mechanics, one
may worry, requires using Weyl quantization for mapping dynamical variables onto
operators. The Q-based interpretation, in contrast is empirically adequate only if
Berezin quantization is.
To give an example, the discrepancy between Weyl and Berezin quantization
can be illustrated with the dynamical variable “square of position”, q2, for a particle










α2 + α∗2 + 2αα∗
)
. (18)
3See [Landsman, 2007, pp. 460-461] for a concise review and comparison.
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â2 + â† 2 + 2ââ†
)
. (19)
Weyl quantization, in contrast, promotes q2 to the operator q̂2. To compare q̂2





â2 + â† 2 + 2ââ† − 1
)
. (20)
Due to the last term in Eq. (20) this differs from Eq. (19).
The quantum mechanical expectation value of q2 expressed in terms of the
Q-function can be computed based on Eqs. (16) and (20):
⟨q2⟩quantum =
∫
dqdp q2 Q(q, p)− ℏ
2mω
. (21)
This differs by − ℏ2mω from the expectation value according to Berezin quantization,
which, according to Eqs. (16) and (19), is
⟨q2⟩quantum =
∫
dqdp q2 Q(q, p) . (22)
By Eq. (14), this is also the physical expectation value according to the Q-based in-
terpretation. Analogous discrepancies between quantum mechanics based on Weyl
quantization on the one hand and the Q-based interpretation on the other are ob-
tained for all dynamical variables where Weyl quantization promotes dynamical
variables to operators that are not in anti-normal order.
A defender of the Q-based interpretation may respond by suggesting that as-
sociating dynamical variables differently with Hermitian linear operators than is
usually done might not alter the empirical content of the theory.4 The operator
that is usually taken to represent the dynamical variable q2 does yield a correct
expectation value, though not for q2 but for q2 − ℏ2mω . The revised association
between dynamical variables and operators in the Q-based intepretation may seem
unnatural, but it is actually a harmless theory-internal re-labelling procedure and
no reason to doubt the empirical adequacy of that interpretation.
This response may not convince everyone. One may object that we often know
quite well the value of which dynamical variable any given measurement device
determines and that we know quite well the results of which measurements we must
compare with the outcomes of which calculations. To give a simple macroscopic
example, we may know that some traffic-monitoring device which measures vehicle
velocity v really does measure v rather than, say, v− 10 km/h. If we have a traffic-
predicting theory T1 that predicts v correctly for all observed vehicles and another
one, T2, that predicts the same numbers as T1, but as values of v− 10 km/h rather
than of v, then T1 is empirically adequate, whereas T2 is not. There are important
differences between this example and the question of empirical adequacy of the Q-
based interpretation—notably, the suggested re-labelling of operators in terms of
dynamical variables by switching to Berezin quantization does not merely concen
one single dynamical variable measured by one specific device—but we may take
4I would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this.
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it as a warning that we should not take the empirical adequacy of the Q-based
interpretation for granted.
For another “wrong” result delivered by the Q-based interpretation recall that,
according to textbook quantum mechanics, for a pure state |ψ⟩, the probability
density and the probability current density in space are
ρψ(q) = |ψ(q)|2 , (23)
jψ(q) = |ψ(q)|2 S(q) , (24)
where ψ(q) is the quantum state evaluated at the position q, and S(q) is the angle
of the wave function in the polar representation:
ψ(q) = |ψ(q)| exp(iS(q)/ℏ).
From the Wigner function, these quantities are obtained by integrating out the
momentum degree(s) of freedom (dropping the time argument for simplicity):
ρψ(q) =
∫
W (q,p)dp , (25)
jψ(q) =
∫
p W (q,p)dp . (26)
But these identities do not hold if we replace the Wigner function by the Q-function.
In that case, the corresponding integrals read (see [Colomés, Zhan, and Oriols,





























These quantities are in general not identical to ρψ(q) and jψ(q), respectively. But
the latter seem to be empirically accessible. Worryingly, interpreting the Q-function
as a proper probability distribution over phase space does not allow one to recover
them as weighted phase space averages.
As a sidenote, however, one may observe that ρQ and jQ at least conform to a




= −div jQ(q, t) . (29)




= −div jψ(q, t) , (30)
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expressing ρψ and jψ in terms of the Wigner function using Eqs. (25) and (26),
performing a Weierstrass transform on both sides of Eq. (30) and using the fact that
the Weierstrass transformation commutes with the temporal and spatial derivatives
if the Wigner function is sufficiently smooth. The fact that Eq. (29) holds signals
that interpreting the Q-function as a proper probability distribution is at least
internally coherent.
Summing up, one may think that the idea of interpreting of the Q-function
as a proper probability function is a non-starter: quantum mechanical expecta-
tion values of dynamical variables as usually computed are not always given by
Q-function-weighted classical phase space integrals, and the marginal distributions
of the Q-function do not correspond to the quantum probability density and prob-
ability current density.
However, as proponents of de Broglie-Bohm theory often highlight, our epi-
stemic access to the values of dynamical variables of microsystems is indirect and
depends on our knowledge of the configurations of macroscopic objects that we use
as pointers or displays of measurement apparatuses. Bell puts it concisely (and a
leading Everettian concurs [Wallace, 2012, p. 21]):
[I]n physics the only observations we must consider are position ob-
servations, if only the positions of instrument pointers. It is a great
merit of the de Broglie-Bohm picture to force us to consider this fact.
If you make axioms, rather than definitions and theorems, about the
“measurement” of anything else, then you commit redundancy and risk
inconsistency. [Bell, 1982, p. 166]
Thus, to check whether an interpretation of the Q-function as a proper probability
distribution over phase space might be empirically adequate, what we really have
to check is whether it produces the right probabilities for what Bell calls “the pos-
itions of instrument pointers.” The positions of instrument pointers over time are
encoded in their phase space locations, thus we have to check whether interpreting
the Q-function as a proper probability distribution delivers the same (for all prac-
tical purposes) predictions for the phase space locations of macroscopic objects in
“measurement” contexts as standard quantun mechanics does.
Let us model the measurement apparatus A as a macroscopic harmonic oscil-
lator with N degrees of freedom, N ≫ 1. Distinct “pointer settings” correspond to
non-overlapping phase space regions Γi of A’s phase space that have macroscopic
dimensions. Suppose that the measurement of the system S that we are performing
is one that we usually characterize as “projective with respect to the non-degenerate
basis {|Bi⟩}.” Suppose further that, at the beginning of the measurement process,
the quantum state that we assign to S is a generic superposition∑
i
ci|Bi⟩, (31)
of the basis states |Bi⟩. The standard view of quantum mechanics is that the
possible measurement outcomes are the eigenvalues Bi of the operator B̂ corres-
ponding to the dynamical variable that is “measured” and that these outcomes are
realized with probabilities |ci|2, respectively. But the eigenvalues are not directly
accessible by observation, only the pointer settings are. Hence, to indicate that the
Q-based interpretation is empirically adequate, one must show that—provided that
the measurement interaction has led to a suitable association between S and A—
the probability P (j) of the pointer setting being in Γj at the end of measurement
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is (to a high degree of approximation) given by |cj |2 in that, if α is the phase space





≈ |cj |2 . (32)
I will now show that this holds, given reasonable assumptions about the measure-
ment process.
Consider first a situation where the state assigned to S prior to the measurement
interaction is one of the eigenstates |Bj⟩ of B̂. To accept the apparatus A as
functioning properly, one will require that the post-measurement pointer setting is
in a specific phase space region Γj with probability 1. (One would usually interpret
this pointer setting as indicating that the value of the measured dynamical variable
is Bj , but, as we will see in the next section, this inference is not licenced under the
Q-based interpretation.) The experimentalist will ascribe a probability distribution
Qj(α) (33)
whose support is (almost entirely) confined to Γj . To show that this function Qj is
(or can be approximated well by) the Q-function of some density operator ρ̂j , note
that the Q-functions associated with coherent states |α′⟩ corresponding to phase





Now recall that Γj is macroscopic, whereas the Gaussians Qα′ in Eq. (34) fall off
on the scale of ℏ. This makes it reasonable to assume that Qj can be approximated
to a high degree of precision by a suitably weighted integral of the Qα′ associated
with phase space points α′ ∈ Γj , weighted by some function µj(α′) which, as well,


































This means that, if S is prepared such that the quantum state assigned to it is |Bj⟩,
the post-measurement quantum state assigned to the apparatus A must be such a
density operator ρ̂j . Accordingly, if we denote the pre-measurement quantum state
of A by ρ̂0, the measurement interaction must fulfil
|Bj⟩⟨Bj |ρ̂0 7→ |Bj⟩⟨Bj |ρ̂j . (37)
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Now, in the general case the pre-measurement state of S is some superposition∑
i
ci|Bi⟩, (38)
and the S +A pre-measurement quantum state is∑
i,j
c∗jci|Bi⟩⟨Bj |ρ̂0, . (39)
The measurement apparatus A is supposed to be macroscopic and it has a mascro-
scopic environment. This means that environment-induced decoherence must be
taken into account in the measurement interaction. Due to decoherence, the post-






Let us refer to the Q-function of this ρ̂S+A as QS+A,post.
The post-measurement Q-function QA,post of the apparatus A is obtained by
integrating this QS+A,post over the phase space of S or, alternatively, from the


























Now, according to the Q-based interpretation, the probability P (j) of obtaining a
“pointer setting” in Γj is given by a phase space integral of this Q-function over Γj .
That integral overwhelmingly comes from the term containing Qj , and the integral





≈ |cj |2. (45)
This is the familiar result as well-confirmed for quantum mechanics using Weyl
quantization. It has been recovered here based on reasonable-looking assumptions
about the measurement process—notably, that the Γi are macroscopic—and on
the interpretation of the Q-function as a proper probability distribution. So we
seem to have some reason to believe that the Q-based interpretation may indeed
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be empirically adequate. Drummond and Reid [2020] discuss some further special
cases, namely, measurement of a quadrature of the electromagnetic field through
amplification, measurement of single-particle spin, and measurement of EPRB-type
correlations using spins of entangled particles. In their analyses, the measurement
apparatus plays the role of an amplification device, and decoherence is not invoked
beyond amplification. Drummond and Reid come to the conclusion that inter-
preting the Q-function as a proper probability function yields empirically adequate
consequences in all the settings that they consider.
5 A further look at measurement
One may have a further worry about the coherence of the Q-based interpretation:
The Q-functions of any two orthogonal quantum states |ψ1⟩ and |ψ2⟩ in general
have overlapping support in phase space. For example, for the one-dimensional
harmonic oscillator with complex phase space variable β (in analogy to α in Section
2 – but I will reserve “α” for the phase space variable of the apparatus) the Q-










Especially for values of n that are close to each other, any two of these functions
can have considerable “overlap”, i.e. there are regions in phase space where they
are both (significantly) different from zero.
Now assume that a quantum system is prepared in an eigenstate |B1⟩ of some
dynamical variable B, associated with an operator B̂, and that, in line with the
Q-based interpretation, this preparation results in the system being at some phase
space point β1 where Q|B1⟩ is non-zero. Now, if the system does not undergo any
further interactions after measurement, subsequent measurement of B results, with
probability 1, in the outcome being the eigenvalue B1 for which B̂|B1⟩ = B1|B1⟩.
In other words, the probability of obtaining B1 when measuring B and the system
is at β1 is 1:
P (B1|β1,B) = 1 . (47)
But this cannot be right. Inevitably, because the Q-functions of orthogonal states
can have non-trivial overlap, there will also be a different eigenstate |B2⟩ of B̂ such
that also Q|B2⟩(β) is non-zero at β1. But this means that β1 could as well have
resulted from preparing |B2⟩. And, in that case, as we know from the empirical
success of quantum mechanics, when measuring B we could be sure to obtain the
result B2. Thus, by the same reasoning that leads to Eq. (47) we derive
P (B2|β1,B) = 1 . (48)
Since, by assumption, B1 ̸= B2, Eqs. (47) and (48) are in contradiction with each
other.
This should not make the proponent of the Q-based interpretation nervous.
Her reaction should simply be to reject both Eq. (47) and Eq. (48). The correct
calculation to determine the probabilities of the different measurement outcomes
is different. It uses the Q-function of the combined system S + A, which, after
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taking into account the measurement interaction but before taking into account





























In the Q-based interpretation, this is interpreted as a proper probability distribution
over (β,α), assigned before registering the pointer position. Registering the pointer
position means finding the phase space location of A to be within some macroscopic
phase space region Γj . Performing Bayesian updating on this information—that
the value of α lies in Γj—means switching from assigning the Q-function Eq. (50)
to assigning




Here N is a normalization factor chosen such that the integral of QjS+A(β,α)
over the combined system S + A phase space is 1. The switch to Eq. (51) entails
measurement collapse for the quantum state of the measured system S. It gets
updated from
∑
i ci|Bi⟩ to |Bj⟩. Note that this is a nice result: von Neumann
collapse for the measured system state has been derived as a consequence of applying
ordinary Bayesian updating to the apparatus Q-function when conditioning on the
registered pointer location.
The eigenvalue Bj of the eigenstate |Bj⟩ to the operator B̂ has not appeared
at all in this analysis. It is only indirectly “inferred” by the experimentalist as the
pointer location is found to be in Γj and the measured system state is “collapsed” to
|Bj⟩. But even talking of Bj as “inferred” might be misleading because, in general,
for values of β where Q|Bj⟩(β) is non-zero, the true value of B will not be Bj . In
the Q-based interpretation, it is simply not the case that the possible values of B
are the eigenvalues of B̂. This is analogous to de Broglie-Bohm theory. As in de
Broglie-Bohm theory, the expression “measurement of dynamical variable B” must
be taken with a grain of salt and should not be understood as “revealing the true
value of B.”
Let us come back to the scenario that gave rise to the worry discussed in the
beginning of this section. There, a measured system was assumed to be prepared
in |B1⟩ and then undergoing measurement of the dynamical variable B. In that
situation, the sum over i in Eq. (50) becomes trivial and the update to Eq. (51)
does not change the Q-function of S+A. The Q-function of S also stays the same,
namely Q|B1⟩(β), throughout the measurement interaction and after registering the
pointer location.
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Thus, the correct take, according to the Q-based interpretation, is not that the
value of B is B1 both before and after the measurement—depending on the value
of β, the actual value of B may actually be different at any of those times—but
that the Q-function assigned to the measured system does not change when that
system is subjected to (what we call) measurement of the dynamical variable B
with respect to which S is prepared in an eigenstate |B1⟩.
The answer to the worry with which this section started, thus, is that, in order
to make claims about a quantum system’s Q-function at different times t, the Q-
function evolution itself must be considered in full. Effects from interactions with
other systems, be they “measurement” interactions or others, must be included in
terms of how they affect the time-evolution of Q.
We can now see more clearly what went wrong in the derivation of the jointly
inconsistent Eqs. (47) and (48): if the measured system is prepared in some state
|C⟩—e.g. by “measuring” a dynamical variable C and selecting for the outcome C—
then this preparation history affects the Q-function and, therefore, has to be taken
into account when computing the probabilities of the different possible inferred
values B1, B2, ... Those are not screened off from the preparation procedure by
the phase space location β that happens to result from the preparation procedure.
It is not acceptable to assume that P (Bj |β,B, C, C) can be simplified according to
P (Bj |β,B, C, C) = P (B|β,B) , (52)
and the derivation of Eqs. (47) and (48) is blocked.
The following section discusses what rejecting (52) means and whether it should
be considered acceptable.
6 λ-mediation and its possible violation
Perhaps the main motivation for the Q-based interpretation is that it allows one to
interpret quantum mechanics along realist lines, somewhat akin to classical stat-
istical mechanics. In classical statistical mechanics one usually does not interpret
the phase space probability distribution ρ as an objective property of the system.
So, if one wants the parallel between quantum mechanics according to the Q-based
interpretation and quantum statistical mechanics to be far-reaching, one will in-
terpret the Q-function as “non-ontic” and the system’s phase space location β as
its complete “ontic” physical state. This is also the perspective that Drummond
and Reid [2020], pioneers of the idea of interpreting the Q-function as a proper
probability function, have in mind, as will be discussed in the following section.
The wave function uniquely fixes the Q-function and vice versa, so, plausibly an
ontic (non-ontic) view of the Q-function is equivalent to an ontic (non-ontic) view
of the quantum state. At the end of this section I consider the option of combining
the Q-based interpretation with an ontic view of Q, but let us first consider the
consequences of a non-ontic view of Q.
In that case, accepting that Eq. (52) fails amounts to rejecting what Leifer and
Pusey [2017] refer to as “λ-mediation”: the assumption that a system’s ontic state
λ “screens off” the outcomes of measurements of the system from its preparation
history. Following Leifer and Pusey [2017, p. 10], λ-mediation is the statement:
The ontic state λ mediates any remaining correlation between the pre-
paration and the measurement[.]
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In terms of the symbols used in this paper, the formula that according to Leifer
and Pusey expresses λ-mediation is precisely Eq. (52), replacing β with the general
ontic state variable λ:
P (B|λ,B, C, C) = P (B|λ,B) . (53)
Is giving up λ-mediation an unacceptably high price for embracing the Q-based
interpretation?
I don’t think so. In fact, a recent paper by Adlam [2018] makes a strong
independent case against requiring λ-mediation. To understand Adlam’s point, it
is important to appreciate that λ-mediation can be construed as an assumption
of temporal locality : if Eq. (53) holds, any correlation, and a fortiori any causal
influence, between the preparation setting C and outcome C on the one hand and
the measurement outcome B must be mediated by the temporally intermediate
ontic state λ.
However, as Adlam points out, we already know quantum theory to be incom-
patible with spatial locality: Eq. (53), but interpreted such that the setting C and
outcome C are space-like separated from B and B. This follows from the fact that
quantum correlations violate Bell inequalities. (These correlations are recovered in
the Q-based interpretation. See the next section for some more comments.) And,
as Adlam sees it, there are no compelling reasons for insisting on temporal locality
while accepting spatial non-locality. In fact, as shown by Evans, Price and Wharton
[2013], accepting temporal non-locality is unavoidable if one is neither prepared to
accept retrocausality nor that operational and ontic symmetries may come apart.
Adlam notes that, as will be discussed below, temporal locality in the form of
λ-mediation is used in the derivation of “ψ-ontology” theorems, which entail that
quantum states must be states of reality. She regards this conclusion as unattractive
and concludes that pursuing temporally non-local interpretations is potentially the
main neglected, yet promising, route in the foundations of quantum theory:
[F]ully embracing temporal nonlocality might open up untapped pos-
sibilities for the interpretation of quantum theory, and hence the whole
landscape of quantum foundations becomes markedly different when
temporal nonlocality is taken seriously. [Adlam, 2018, p. 3]
To be sure, the assumption that ontic states mediate between preparation and
measurement may indeed seem very natural. Notably, Leifer and Pusey themselves
regard λ-mediation as encoding a core feature of scientific realism:
In our view, the idea that ontic states are responsible for correlations
between preparation and measurement, which is the idea behind λ-
mediation, is also a core feature of a realist theory. It encodes the idea
that ontic states are supposed to explain what we see in experiments.
[Leifer and Pusey, 2017, p. 21]
And indeed, explaining what we see in experiments in terms of the ontic states of
microsystems is part and parcel of physical practice. But this is not a strong reason
for accepting λ-mediation: if our best fundamental physical theory entails strong
nomic constraints on correlations across time but rules out that those correlations
are mediated by temporally intermediate ontic states, this indicates that funda-
mental physics is interestingly different from everyday physics and the higher-level
sciences; it does not indicate that we have to scale back the ambitions of science.
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When adopting the Q-based interpretation, one can avoid giving up λ-mediation
by adopting an ontic account of Q and denying that a system’s phase location is its
complete ontic state. The complete ontic state would then be Λ = (β0, Q(β)) (or,
equivalently, Λ = (β0, ρ̂)). Borrowing terminology from certain modal interpreta-
tions of quantum mechanics, one might refer to a system’s phase space location β0
as its value state and its Q-function Q(β) as its dynamical state: the latter determ-
ines the probabilities of specific values of β at different times, and these cannot be
determined from the value state β0 at some specific time t alone.
However, alongside the advantage of allowing one to preserve λ-mediation, an
ontic view of the Q-function also has the severe downside that it creates a schism
between probabilities as actually used in the application of quantum mechanics and
the Q-function:5 whenever some measurement outcome is registered, the Q-function
assigned to the measured system gets “updated”, in the setting considered above
from Q|ψ⟩(β) to Q|Bi⟩(β). A proponent of the Q-based interpretation who regards
the Q-function as ontic will presumably adopt a “no- (ontic) collapse” view and re-
gard this update as not corresponding to any physical change. Like the proponent
of de Broglie-Bohm theory, she will consider measurement collapse as a shift to an
“effective” Q-function, made for the sake of predictive and computational conveni-
ence, and identify the proper, physical, Q-function with the one corresponding to
the uncollapsed quantum state. Strictly speaking, the only quantum state that is
really ontic, in this view, is the uncollapsed “ur-” wave function of the universe
that includes all decoherent branches, including “empty” ones that have no further
effect on the dynamics of phase space location.6
One may also feel that it is unclear what kind of entity the Q-function would
have to be on an ontic view of it. Options here seem to largely parallel those
for interpreting the non-collapsing universal wave function ψ in de Broglie-Bohm
theory, which unavoidably has “empty branches.”
In any case, it appears to be more straightforward that the global ψ in de
Broglie-Bohm theory must be ontic than that the uncollapsed, global, Q-function
must be ontic in the Q-based interpretation. The reason is that in de Broglie-Bohm
theory, ψ directly couples to ontic particle velocity via the guidance equation for









(Q1, ...,QN ) . (54)
Inasmuch as Eq. (15) is a good guide to microdynamics in the Q-based interpret-
ation, the situation is different there: the “time-mixing” conditional probabilities
5In de Broglie-Bohm theory, this schism manifests itself in the challenge of justifying
why “quantum equilibrium” obtains. In the Everett interpretation, it manifests itself in
the probability problem—justifying why branch weights effectively manifest themselves
as probabilities—which is often regarded as the most serious difficulty for the Everett
interpretation.
6However, if experiments that involve the reversal of decoherence (“recoherence”) ever
become a reality, calculations based on the collapsed state and its associated Q-function
may become empirically inadequate. Based on this observation, Lazarovici and Hubert
[2019] have recently argued that the (hypothetical) possibility of recoherence counts de-
cisively against epistemic accounts of the quantum state. Recoherence also plays a central
role in the much-discussed paradox recently proposed by Frauchiger and Renner [2018].
The response of the proponent of the Q-based interpretation to that paradox will plausibly
depend on the ontological status accorded to Q.
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of field configurations at different times do not involve the Q-function but only the
central difference Lagrangian L. There does not seem to be a similarly straightfor-
ward reason for adopting a ψ-ontic (Q-ontic) view as for de Broglie-Bohm theory.
However, assuming that some specific Q-function has been assigned for some spe-
cific time and assuming that no further updating takes place, it is an objective
matter which Q-function one should assign for any other specific time. In that
sense, the central difference Langrangian L and the stochastic diffusion equations
governing the time-evolution of the Q-function are plausibly objective in any ver-
sion of the Q-based interpretation, including Q-epistemic ones. (Whether one may
want to call them “ontic” will presumably depend on one’s preferred metaphysical
account of laws of time-evolution.)
7 Evading no-go theorems and the question of ret-
rocausality
Epistemic accounts of quantum states (“ψ-epistemic accounts”) are prima facie
attractive because they allow one to conceive of measurement collapse as related
to Bayesian updating [Spekkens, 2007, Fuchs and Schack, 2013, Friederich, 2014,
Healey, 2017]. The Q-based interpretation, when combined with an epistemic ac-
count of the Q-function, exemplifies this attractive feature. It is expressed in the
update of Eq. (50) to Eq. (51). However, there are various no-go theorems [Pusey,
Barrett and Rudolph, 2012, Hardy, 2013, Colbeck and Renner, 2017] which seri-
ously limit the options for viable ψ-epistemic accounts. One may wonder whether
they pose any problems for the Q-based interpretation.
Interestingly, as already mentioned, λ-mediation is used in the proofs of all
those theorems. The streamlined review [Leifer, 2014] of the “ψ-ontology” theor-
ems uses the ontological models framework [Harrigan and Spekkens, 2010] as the
unifying background. But this framework includes λ-mediation as a conceptual
presupposition of ontological models. Theorems proved in the ontological models
framework are thus inapplicable to the Q-based interpretation. Those theorems,
including the famous PBR theorem, therefore do not spell trouble for the Q-based
interpretation when combined with an epistemic account of Q.
λ-mediation is also used in proofs of Bell’s theorem. It appears in Bell’s original
proof [Bell, 1964, Eq. (1)] and implicitly in modern versions as a pre-condition for
locality, e.g. [Goldstein, Norsen, Tausk and Zanghi, 2011, Eq. (4)]. Thus, trivially,
Bell locality is violated by the Q-based interpretation. There is no particular dif-
ficulty with recovering the observed violations of Bell inequalities in the Q-based
interpretation, as demonstrated by Drummond and Reid [2020, Fig. 5] for a simple
special case.
The fact that λ-mediation is violated in the Q-based interpretation when com-
bined with an epistemic account of Q also entails that the standard characerization
of (non-) contextuality due to Spekkens [2005] is not applicable to this interpret-
ation. The same holds for a more recent characterization of non-contextuality
[Shrapnel and Costa, 2018], which is also based on a version of λ-mediation (“ω-
mediation”). Inasmuch as one regards any interpretation that violates λ-mediation
(or ω-mediation) as trivially contextual, one will regard the Q-based interpretation
combined with an epistemic account of Q as trivially contextual.
The Q-based interpretation combined with an ontic view of Q does not violate
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λ-mediation and can be classified according to the characterization of Spekkens
[2005]. Orthodox quantum mechanics with only pure states regarded as ontic (the
“Beltrametti-Bugajski model”) qualifies as preparation contextual by that stand-
ard because different combinations of pure state preparations can result in different
distributions over ontic states even if they correspond to the same mixed state ρ̂.
The same holds for de Broglie-Bohm theory and, plausibly, for the Q-based inter-
pretation when combined with an ontic account of Q. Both these interpretations
have analogous conceptions of a global Ψ/Q and of collapse as merely effective and
approximate.
Drummond and Reid [2020], proposing the idea of interpreting the Q-function
as a proper probability function, clearly aim to combine it with an epistemic account
of quantum states when they write that “that the originators of quantum mechanics
regarded the quantum wave-function as statistical [50] for good reason.” [Drum-
mond and Reid, 2020, p. 3] Unlike the present paper, however, they do not consider
λ-mediation and its potential failure to be relevant as enabling a ψ-epistemic ac-
count. In the first published preprint version of [Drummond and Reid, 2020] they
argue that the reason why the PBR and other “ψ-ontology” theorems do not ap-
ply to their interpretation, according to themselves, is that this interpretation is
retrocausal: “Theorems requiring an ontological wave-function do not apply to our
model [...] because of retrocausality [...] due to negative diffusion terms in the
dynamical equations ” [Drummond and Reid, 2020, p. 1 v1]. This is an allusion to
Q-function dynamics in bosonic quantum field theory being determined by diffusion
equations with opposite signs for different degrees of freedom, as discussed in the
context of Eqs. (12) and (15).
Drummond and Reid are correct that retrocausality, just like the failure of λ-
mediation, can make ψ-ontology theorems inapplicable. (See [Friederich and Evans,
2019] for a recent review of the options opening up in quantum foundations when
accepting retrocausality.) Notably, retrocausal effects from measurement settings
backwards in time to earlier states of affairs can lead to violations of an assumption
called measurement independence. This assumption is incorporated in the ontolo-
gical models framework just like λ-mediation and was identified as crucial already
by Bell in the derivation of his famous non-locality theorem. Measurement inde-
pendence obtains if measurement settings are uncorrelated with earlier states of
affairs λ that are considered as possible confounders. Giving up measurement in-
dependence and accepting retrocausality might appear to be an extravagant move,
but there are strong arguments that it is actually metaphysically “cheap” [Evans,
2015].
However, the appearance of negative diffusion terms in Q-function dynamics
does not by itself entail a failure of measurement independence. These are logically
independent matters. If a system is prepared at time t0 using a measurement
setting C and measurement output C and is subjected to measurement at time
tf > t0 using a measurement setting B, measurement independence comes down to
the identity
Pt(λ|B, C, C) = Pt(λ|C, C) (55)
for intermediate times t with t0 < t < tf . According to Eq. (55), conditioning on
a later measurement setting has no effect on the probability assigned to the ontic
state λ at t when controlling for the preparation procedure.
Eq. (55) holds in de Broglie-Bohm theory, where the ontic state λ includes
19
both the position of the system in configuration space and the universal quantum
state Ψ (which evolves deterministically anyway). There is no reason to think that
the situation is any different in the no-collapse ψ-ontic (or Q-ontic) version of the
Q-based interpretation, where λ includes the phase space location β and the ontic
Q.
In an epistemic account of Q, the time-evolution of Q does not occur on the
ontic level of physical processes (though the laws of time-evolution themselves are
arguably objective, as argued at end of Section 6), so the fact that it is partly
governed by negative diffusion coefficients provides even less reason for inferring a
violation of measurement independence than it does in an ontic account of Q. This
still leaves open the possibility that there could be an argument for measurement
independence being violated in epistemic accounts of Q, but I do not currently see
one.7
Depending on one’s preferred philosophical account of causality, one may dia-
gnose retrocausality without violation of measurement independence. In principle,
there could be accounts of causality according to which the fact that Q-function dy-
namics is characterized by backward-in-time diffusion for some degrees of freedom
intrinsically qualifies as an instance of retrocausality. But then again, retrocausality
identified by the standards of such accounts does not entail the violation of meas-
urement independence and, therefore, is not directly linked to the “retrocausality
loophole” of the no-go theorems.
On the other hand, retrocausality by the standards of mainstream interven-
tionist accounts of causality does seem to require the violation of measurement
independence, i.e. that Eq. (55) does not hold and that choosing which B to meas-
ure has an impact on λ. The fact that we have a formula Eq. (15) to compute the
“time-mixing” conditional probability P (ϕx,f , ϕy,0|ϕx,0, ϕy,f ), which encodes the
stochastic dynamics of diffusion, does not mean that we can in practice manipulate
ϕy,f and thereby, indirectly, intervene backwards in time on ϕy,0. Put differently,
the fact that, as Drummond and Reid [2020, p. 7] highlight, future boundary con-
straints are needed “to obtain a single, probabilistic, trajectory”, does not mean
that agents can indeed, as a matter of practical possibility, impose future conditions
and thereby affect the past. Without supplementary arguments to the contrary, Eq.
(15), as it stands, has a purely correlational interpretation.
To conclude, it might be possible to provide a compelling argument that the
Q-based interpretation entails retrocausality, as claimed by Drummond and Reid,
but so far no such argument has been given.
8 Towards Q-based interpretations of relativistic
quantum theories and quantum field theories
For historical reasons—and for the sake of simplicity—interpretations of quantum
theories are often introduced for non-relatistic quantum mechanics. Except for the
passages where I reviewed Drummond’s results centred around Eqs. (12) and (15) I
have done the same here for the Q-based interpretation. For some interpretations,
notably the de Broglie-Bohm theory, the main technical challenge that they face
7I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for curing me of the impression to possess
such an argument.
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is precisely how to generalize them to relativistic and/or quantum field theoretical
settings.
Fortunately, the prospects for applying the Q-based interpretation to relativ-
istic quantum field theories seem quite good. In fact, Drummond and Reid [2020]
introduce the idea of interpreting the Q-function as a proper probability for relativ-
istic quantum field theory, with an ontology of classical fields rather than point-like
particles. In that context, the Q-function Q(λ) is defined over composite classical
fields
λ = [ϕ1, ϕ2, ..., ξ1, ξ2, ...] , (56)
where ϕ1, ϕ2, ... correspond to bosons, and ξ1, ξ2, ... are real, anti-symmetric,
matrix-valued fields which correspond to fermions [Drummond and Reid, 2020, p.
2].
As Drummond and Reid highlight, “[t]he Q-function is the probability at some
time t, but in this model, fields have continuous trajectories λ(t) defined at all
times” [Drummond and Reid, 2020, p. 3]. Because Q assigns a value to any given
field configuration and its conjugate momentum at a given time, Q itself is frame-
dependent. On an epistemic account of quantum states—which, as discussed above,
may fit most naturally with the Q-based interpretation—different agents may legit-
imately assign different quantum states to one and the same system. If those agents
are sufficiently far apart and/or their rest frames are different, the information that
they have about the system, on which they can base their quantum state assign-
ment, may be quite different. This observation raises intriguing questions about the
constraints under which Q-function ascriptions by different agents to fields in one
and the same space-time region can be coherent and legitimate. Addressing those
questions is, however, beyond the scope of the present exploration of the Q-based
interpretation.
In any case—and potentially relevant to the question of how the Q-based inter-
pretation fits into a relativistic setting—the Q-based interpretation does not seem
to force one to accept any superluminal causation, at least not absent any further
insights into micro-physics that would suggest otherwise. Notably, if the operators
corresponding to dynamical variables associated with space-like separated regions
commute (“local commutativity”), the reduced density operator ρ̂red of a system
confined to some (finite, compact) region I is not affected by the interactions in-
volved in measuring some dynamical variable B in some region II that is space-like
separated from I.
For assume that a system in region I has been prepared in accordance with a
procedure associated with some quantum state ρ̂. Then, according to the Q-based
interpretation, the probabilities of its possible phase space locations β, assigned
from the perspective of an agent co-located in I, are
PI(β) = Qρ̂(β) . (57)
Since, per local commutativity, the measurement of B in region II has no instant-
aneous effect on ρ̂, conditioning with respect to its setting has no effect on the
probabilities in region I:
PI(β|B) = Qρ̂red(β) = Qρ̂(β) = PI(β) . (58)
Since the measurement setting B can be seen as an arbitrary intervention set to some
variable, this indicates that interventions cannot influence phase space locations of
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objects at space-like distance according to the Q-based interpretation. Of course,
conditioning not only on the measurement setting B but also on the measurement
outcome B can have a dramatic effect on ρ̂red and, thus, on the probabilities of
phase space locations of objects at space-like distance. But these outcomes are not
manipulable and, hence, the “non-local” correlations violating Bell-type inequalities
are not causal, at least not by the standards of mainstream interventionist accounts
of causation.
A further reassuring finding when it comes to generalizing the Q-based in-
terpretation to relativistic quantum field theory is that there seem to be unique
Q-functions in both bosonic and fermionic quantum field theories, including those
with massive fields. Rosales-Zárate and Drummond [2015] provide an abstract
characterization of a Q-function in terms of fulfilling the following three criteria:
(1) It exists uniquely for any quantum density-matrix.
(2) It is a positive probability distribution.
(3) Observables are moments of the distribution.
[Rosales-Zárate and Drummond, 2015, p. 2]
The general form of a Q-function that fulfils these criteria is [Rosales-Zárate and
Drummond, 2015, Eq. 2.2]
Q(λ) = Tr[Λ̂(λ)ρ̂] , (59)
where Λ(λ) is a positive definite Hermitian Hilbert space basis which is normalized
such that, for an integral over phase space domain D with phase space measure
dµ(λ) [Rosales-Zárate and Drummond, 2015, Eq. 2.1],∫
D
Λ̂(λ)dµ(λ) = 1 . (60)
For bosonic field theories, the basis Λ(λ) for which the three above conditions
are uniquely fulfilled consists of projectors onto the Glauber coherent states which
generalize the harmonic oscillator coherent states Eq. (5) to coherent states of the
boson field. For fermionic field theories, fermionic Gaussian operators take the
place of the projectors onto the coherent states [Rosales-Zárate and Drummond,
2015, Eqs. 3.6, 3.7], the Q-function basis has a “gauge” freedom, but with these
replacements the overall form of the Q-function is same as for boson fields [Rosales-
Zárate and Drummond, 2015, Eqs. 4.18, 5.1].
9 Conclusion and outlook at further challenges
I conclude this paper by recapitulating selected features of the Q-based interpret-
ation that make it attractive and worthy of being developed further. I also outline
challenges for future work.
First, an incomplete list of attractive features of the Q-based interpretation:
• The Q-based interpretation promises having no measurement problem. It
assumes that every quantum system has a definite location in phase space
at all times and all dynamical variables defined as functions on phase space
have definite values at all times.
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• The Q-based interpretation treats microscopic and macroscopic systems as
on the same ontological footing and does not rely on any primitive anthro-
pocentric concepts (such as “measurement” or “observer”).
• The Q-based interpretation allows one to interpret wave function collapse
as reflecting Bayesian updating of the probability distribution over phase
space in the light of evidence about the pointer location (though collapse is
understood as merely “effective” if an ontic account of Q is chosen).
• The Q-based interpretation does not add any novel elements to the formalism
of quantum theory that are not needed to derive that formalism’s empirical
consequences. Notably, it does not postulate any additional dynamical prin-
ciples of wave function collapse. The micro-physics encoded in Eq. (15) follow
from Q-function dynamics, which in turn follow from the von Neumann equa-
tion.
• The Q-based interpretation applies beyond non-relativistic quantum mech-
anics, to relativistic and field-theoretic settings. It seems compatible with
relativistic space-time and does not seem to licence any superluminal causa-
tion.
Challenges and avenues for future work on the Q-based interpretation—partly dis-
cussed here, partly not—include (but are not restricted to) those that arise from
the questions:
• Is the Q-based interpretation really empirically adequate?
• How can Drummond’s insights into Q-function dynamics and underlying mi-
crodynamics be generalized to quantum field theories beyond the massless
bosonic case?
• Should the Q-based interpretation be combined with an epistemic or ontic
account of the Q-function?
• When discussing foundational problems in quantum statistical mechanics
that arise already in classical statistical mechanics—e.g. the problem of
the arrow of time—what is the effect of considering the Q-function as the
quantum analogue of the classical probability distribution ρ?
• Which philosophical accounts of probability, the laws of nature, time, causal-
ity and other key scientific concepts fit well with the Q-based interpretation?
The purpose of this paper has been fulfilled if readers are convinced that the Q-
based interpretation is sufficiently promising that trying to answer these questions
is worth some effort.
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